Monday, November 30, 2015

HISTORY OF ISRAEL Zionism: from 1890 - Draiman




HISTORY OF ISRAEL

Zionism: from 1890

Ever since the loss of a national home in Palestine, with the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in AD 70, the idea of a return to Jerusalem has been a romantic and indeed ritual part of the shared religious life of Jewish communities spread around the world. The service on Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar) ends with the words 'Next year in Jerusalem'. 

This remains a distant dream until a few authors in the early 19th century begin to advocate the establishment of a real Jewish home in Palestine. They have little practical influence, but at the end of the century the idea begins to gather political momentum, being known from 1890 as Zionism. The turning point comes in 1896 with the publication of Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) by a secular Jew, the journalist Theodor Herzl. The book is his response to a recent and rapid increase in anti-Semitism in many parts of Europe, particularly in Russia but also to a marked degree in Herzl's own region, Austria-Hungary. 

The attempt to achieve a Jewish homeland in Palestine becomes the dominant political ambition of Herzl's life. In the mere nine years between The Jewish State and his early death at the age of forty-five, he devotes himself, in a whirlwind of activity, to securing an audience with a succession of powerful international leaders, to whom he presents his case – often with considerable success. The movement attracts more and more followers, and they finally achieve a breakthrough of great significance when the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, is persuaded in 1917 to sign a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leader of Britain's Jewish community. 

Jewish immigration to Palestine: from 1882 The letter, subsequently known as the Balfour Declaration, states: His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country 

This becomes both a powerful document, as a very strong endorsement of a Jewish national home in Palestine, but it is also a controversial one. It is argued by many that the provision for protecting the rights of non-Jewish Palestinians has been disregarded since the creation of the modern state of Israel. 

The encouragement given by the Balfour Declaration is a major factor in the growth of Jewish immigration to Palestine. From the 1880s to the Balfour Declaration the average number of new arrivals has been about 900 per year. Following the Declaration, during the 1920s, that goes up to 12,000 per year. And the terrifying rise in anti_Semitism during the 1930s, not only in Nazi Germany, increases that figure again to 30,000 per year. This brings the Jewish population from 5% of the Palestinian Arabs in 1880 to more than 40% in 1939. 

The pattern of early immigration by small groups establishes the important Israeli tradition of the kibbutz, originally a purely agricultural settlement, of a utopian socialist nature based on shared rights and ownership. Kibbutzim (the Hebrew plural of the noun) are sited wherever land is available, either by purchase from Palestinians or in places too barren to have been farmed by others. They therefore tend to be isolated and difficult to defend whenever their Arab neighbours become hostile. But their number grows rapidly, in later years often being factory-based. And even though the majority of immigrants have from the 1930s been individuals settling in towns, there are still in the early 21st century more than 250 kibbutzim in Israel. The first kibbutz was established in 1909-10 at Degania, south of the Sea of Galilee, by a small group of immigrants from Russia. 
 








The British mandate: 1922-39

After World War I Palestine acquires a new governing power, Britain. For more than four centuries it has been part of the Turkish Ottoman empire, since its conquest by the sultan in 1516. But Turkey is a loser in the First World War, having sided with Germany. As with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the League of Nations is given the task of dismantling the empires of the defeated nations. 

In May 1920 the League announces its decision for the Turkish territories east of the Mediterranean. France is given a mandate to govern Syria and Lebanon. The mandated territories entrusted to Britain are Iraq and Palestine, with the region east of the Jordan to be administered separately as Transjordan (the definition and boundaries of these territories are defined by the League on a largely arbitrary basis). It is specifically stated that Palestine is to be an exception to the principle of self-determination that defines League policies elsewhere. Clearly an Arab Palestinian state would immediately prevent the creation of a homeland for the Jews. 

The hardest task confronting Britain is to keep the peace between the Jews and the more numerous population of Palestinian Arabs, resenting the arrival of so many foreigners and well aware of the Zionist dream of creating a state of Israel. During the 1920s the policy of Britain in relation to these two rival communities is unclear and vacillating. At first Jewish immigration is encouraged, in keeping with the Balfour Declaration, but problems arising from Arab opposition soon modify this policy. 

From the very start, from the announcement of the British mandate (formally established not until 1922), there are clear indications of the strength of hostility within the Arab community. As early as 1920 there are attacks on Jews, resulting in a few deaths, in four days of rioting during the annual Nebi Musa festival in and around Jerusalem. These attacks, followed by more serious ones in 1921, prompt the formation of the Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary group of volunteers committed to the defence of Jewish settlements. They also prompt the first concession to Arab opinion. The British are well aware of the need to avoid giving offence to neighbouring Arab states and to the millions of Muslims in India. In the short term immigration is suspended, followed by a promise that henceforth it will be strictly controlled. 

During the rest of the period between the wars there is a gradual increase in the violence and extent of Arab riots against Jews. A particularly extreme outburst occurs in 1929. Beginning with an Arab attack on Jews at the holy Western Wall of the Temple (also known as the Wailing Wall), the violence rapidly spreads throughout Palestine. Within the next few days 133 Jews are killed and 87 Arabs, many of the latter by British troops trying to restore order. These dangers are met by a corresponding build-up of Jewish paramilitary groups, in particular the Haganah. By the early 1930s David Ben-Gurion, has become the de facto leader of the Jewish community as leader of the left-wing political party Mapai (founded by the merger of two parties in 1930), and from now on he is the main contact between the community and the British. 

An Arab general strike in 1936, accompanied by a demand for an immediate end to Jewish immigration, leads to another major outbreak of violence against Jews, resulting this time in 80 Jewish and`140 Arab deaths as the British struggle to maintain order. The British response is to set up a Royal Commission, headed by Lord Peel, to investigate possible solutions to an increasingly dangerous situation. The Peel Report (1937) concludes that reconciliation is impossible and that the only solution is to set up two states, with the Jews occupying a small territory in the north of Palestine and Jerusalem retained as a permanent British mandate. Reluctantly the Jews accept this proposal, on the grounds that a small state is better than none, but it is categorically rejected by the Arabs. 

Violence against Jews continues, particularly after 1938, forcing the British to intervene more actively on the Jewish side. Arms are provided to enable outlying Jewish settlements to defend themselves, contributing significantly to the growing strength of the Haganah which by1939 is a very effective fighting force armed with foreign weapons. But the approach of war soon causes another reversal in British policy. 
 








The British mandate: AD 1939-48

Practical politics dictate Britain's decision that concessions need to be made to the Arabs in view of the danger of German forces achieving a quick route to India through the Middle East or the Suez canal. By contrast, it can be reasoned, the Jews of Palestine must inevitably support Britain in a war against Hitler. 

The result is that a decision profoundly distressing to the Jews is taken. At just the time when the greatest number of Jews need to escape from Germany and eastern Europe, a limit of 75,000 is placed on immigration for the next five years, and thereafter any immigration is to be permitted only with Arab consent. This frustrates any hopes of a Jewish state, guaranteeing that Jews would remain a permanent minority within Palestine. But in the short term the calculation proves correct. In spite of the general sense of outrage at the limit on immigration. more than 30,000 Jews from Palestine volunteer to fight with British forces. In 1944 an entirely Jewish unit, the Jewish Brigade, is formed within the British army. 

With large numbers of British troops in the region the war years are relatively peaceful. But the political situation strongly suggests to many that a Jewish state will only be achieved through force of arms. The Jews therefore do their best to enlist volunteers and to train them in guerrilla warfare for when the crisis comes. But a few of its members begin to take a more extreme line, believing that constant and active resistance is required against the British occupiers of Palestine. 

This is a view long held by the first major splinter group from the Haganah, known as the Irgun and established in 1931. A second is formed by Avraham Stern in 1940, widely known as the Stern Gang but going by the official name of Lehi. This group believes that Irgun's tactics are too feeble and that terrorist attacks on British targets are the only way forward. By the end of the war the Irgun takes the same view. Of the four most significant attacks against the British, Lehi is responsible for the assassination in 1944 of Lord Moyne, a British minister of state in Cairo, and in 1948 of Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine. For their part the Irgun, in 1946, blows up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem (headquarters of the British administration), resulting in 91 deaths, and in the same year plants a bomb in the British embassy in Rome. 

The Irgun and Lehi also have a more recent influence in Israeli history. Two of their activists play very prominent roles in Likud, the political party that has been the dominant force in the nation's politics since 1977. Menachem Begin, who as leader of the Irgun authorizes the attack on the King David Hotel, becomes the first Likud prime minister in 1977. Yitzhak Shamir, as joint leader of Lehi, plots the two assassinations in 1946 and follows Begin as prime minister in 1986. 

It has for a while been evident to both Jews and Palestinians that the departure of the British must soon be imminent and that this will inevitably be followed by armed conflict. It was essential to the Jews to have as much time as possible to build up the military strength of the Haganah, by now in effect their army. In February 1947, just months after the King David Hotel atrocity, the Zionist leader David Ben Gurion pleads with the British to stay, promising in return to put an end to Jewish terrorism. But Britain, with 100,000 troops tied up in Palestine attempting to keep an impossible peace, is interested only in a rapid departure. 

In May 1947 the British government hands the problem over to the United Nations, which sets up a Committee on Palestine. In August the committee recommends that the region must be partitioned into an Arab and a Jewish state, very much along the lines of the British Peel Report of 1937 except that Jerusalem is to be administered under an international rather than British mandate. This solution is adopted by the General Assembly in November. As with the Peel Report, it is welcomed by the Jewish community but violently opposed by the Arabs. In effect it is entirely disregarded in Palestine, where the violence between Jews and Arabs is dramatically increasing, so much so that the period between November 1947 and May 1948 is often referred to by historians as the Civil War. Israelis prefer to link it to the subsequent Arab-Israeli War as the War of Independence. 

Preparations for conflict are being carried out by both communities and by neighbouring Arab countries. Two atrocities stand out in particular as examples of the methods now employed by extremists on both sides in Palestine. On 9 April 1948 the small Arab village of Deir Yassin, near Jerusalem, stands in the way of a band of fighters from the Irgun and Levi who are moving towards the city in an attempt to frustrate a Palestinian blockade. An attack on the village leaves more than 100 people dead, including women and children. A few days later, in an ambush at Hadassah on a road into Jerusalem, an Arab reprisal is carried out on a medical convoy to a hospital on Mount Scopus, killing seventy-seven Jewish doctors and nurses. But there are many lesser acts of terrorism against both communities. 

Early in 1948 Britain announces that the mandate will end on May 14. Knowledge of the date only serves to intensify the preparation of both sides for the conflict ahead.

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The state of Israel: 1948

On 12 April 1948, a month before the departure of the British, a Provisional Government is set up with David Ben Gurion as chairman and minister of defence. And in the afternoon of May 14, the last day of the Mandate, Ben Gurion declares the creation of the state of Israel and signs the Declaration of Independence. The makes no mention of any proposed boundaries but is pacific in tone, appealing to all Palestinians to join in the building of the new state on the basis of full and equal citizenship, and looking forward to a state of peace and friendship between Israel and its Arab neighbours. But alas, events are to prove otherwise.

Areas of Palestine are clearly identifiable by the relative number of Jews and Arabs in each, forming the basis of the UN plan for partition. It immediately becomes of paramount importance for each side to defend and if possible to enlarge the territory allotted to it by the UN. On the Israeli side this is helped by the increasing panic felt by ordinary Palestinian villagers, many of them opting already for flight to other parts of Palestine or to neighbouring Arab countries. And in parts of the new state Arabs are forcibly expelled from their villages. By the end of June more than 300,000 are refugees, to be followed soon by many others – beginning the problem which more than sixty years later remains a major obstacle to achieving peace in the region.

On the very day of Ben-Gurion's declaration of the new state, Egyptian aircraft bomb Tel Aviv. On May 15, when the last British soldiers leave, Iraqi troops cross the Jordan. That same night Syrian troops with thirty armoured vehicles come down from the Golan heights, while Israeli soldiers march seven miles into Lebanon to blow up a strategic bridge. The first Arab-Israeli War has begun. It will last for nearly a year, during which (in January 1949) elections are held for a fully elected parliament. Mapai is the winning party, so David Ben Gurion becomes Israel's first prime minister – a position he will hold, with one short break in 1954-55, for the next fifteen years.









The first Arab-Israeli war: 1948-9

During the first two days of the war, the neighbouring Arab nations launch a coherent plan of attack, with troops from Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt advancing on different fronts. They number in all about 15.000 men. But Israel is by now very much better prepared for conflict than could have been expected. Six months previously, at the time of the UN resolution, its army, an enlarged version of Haganah, had numbered 4,500: now it is more than 36,000.

The war, which lasts until March 1949, is vigorously fought on land, the sea and in the air, with the Israelis developing at short notice naval and airforce capabilities. The UN desperately tries to negotiate a truce between the sides, to give a breathing space and the opportunity to achieve a political settlement, and a four-week truce (known now as the First Truce) begins on June 11. The ceasefire itself holds for all but the last day of the four weeks, but both sides disregard the terms of the truce by taking the opportunity to build up their forces. The Israelis almost double the size of their army (from about 35,000 to more than 60,00) and contrive a significant increase in their armaments and ammunition. And both sides use the opportunity to move fresh troops to the front lines.

During the four weeks the negotiator appointed by the UN, the Swedish Count Bernadotte, proposes a new partition plan which is rejected by both sides. So full-scale fighting resumes on July 8. But after further UN efforts a second truce begins ten days later. This time it holds longer (no time limit has been placed on it at the start) and in September Bernadotte proposes a new partition. Again it is rejected by both sides. But it provokes a violent response from Lehi, the most extreme of the Israeli paramilitary groups. On the day after the new proposal of partition is published, September 17, they ambush and assassinate Count Bernadotte, fearing that the Knesset might accept his terms (unknown to Lehi, its members have already voted to reject them).

Five days after the assassination, on September 22, the Knesset passes into law an act, the Area of Jurisdiction, which dramatically alters the nature of the conflict. Instead of appearing to defend the area allotted to it in the various various partition plans, the state is now officially fighting to extend it. The act states that the area already captured and any land to be captured in future is annexed as part of Israel.

In the event the second truce lasts another month. Fighting resumes on October 15 and continues until 10 March 1949. During the early months of 1949 Israel agrees an armistice with each of its Arab neighbours, the last being Transjordan. The final Israeli success is a quick dash through Transjordanian territory to to reach the Red Sea on March 11, at what would become Eilat at the northern tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. They are a historic two days. On March 10 administrative powers are transferred from the Provisional Government to the Knesset. And on March 11 the United Nations votes to accept Israel as a member state.

By the end of the war Israel's territory has been extended to the north and to the south and by the occupation of part of the West Bank. The other part of the West Bank, bordering the Jordan river, is captured during the war by the forces of Transjordan. The king of Transjordan takes the opportunity of annexing the territory in 1950, changing the name of his kingdom to Jordan and becoming the only Arab country to have gained significant territories within the region of mandated Palestine.

But Israel's success and increase of territory has created an extra 600,000 Palestinian refugees, fleeing from their farms and villages. By 1952, just three years after independence, 1,400,000 people, a quarter of Israel's population, are housed in properties abandoned by Palestinian Arabs.

The war years have also revealed a factor that will remain a constant in the region. The Arab nations have been shown to be disorganized and weakened by mutual rivalries, while the state of Israel, less than a year old, has discovered a national cohesion, a passionate commitment by all its citizens and a military strength that will stand it in very good stead in future conflicts.Although full-scale war has ended, the years after 1949 are never peaceful. Israel, surrounded by hostile states openly committed to its destruction, is subject to constant raids across the border from all directions and sometimes reacts with extreme cautionary reprisals. An example is the long border with Jordan. During the five-year period from 1951 to 1956 there are more than 6000 aggressive border crossings and about 400 Israelis are killed.

In 1953 a reprisal raid is planned on an Arab village near the border, with Ariel Sharon in command. The written instructions from army HQ state that the object is 'to carry out destruction and maximum killing in order to drive the villagers from their homes'. Sixty-nine people are killed, mainly women and children, causing international outrage. But there is no full-scale military action involving Israel until the Suez campaign of 1956.









Building the nation: from 1948

David Ben-Gurion's Mapai party dominates Israeli politics until 1977, though from 1965 without Ben-Gurion himself. He has left in 1965, with a small but distinguished group of colleagues (including Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres) to form Rafi, a new party of his own. In 1968 Mapai, still the largest left-wing party in the country, leads a coalition with Rafi to form the Israeli Labor Party. This broadly continues Mapai's policies until for the first time losing an election, in 1977.

In its founding year, 1948, Israel shows a dramatic commitment to enabling all Jews to come to Israel. The Declaration of Independence has guaranteed their right to do so, but some are unable to – most notably many in the Yemen, who have been suffering anti-Semitic violence during the Arab-Israeli war and are too poor to leave. Israel now offers them free travel into the country and a new life when they get there. But there are two problems – how to bring them, and how to pay for it and for accommodation when they get to Israel.

The financial challenge in receiving a large number of immigrants begins a relationship that has been crucial to Israel. Ben-Gurion entrusts Golda Meir with the task of solving it. She goes to the USA and appeals passionately, and with success, to Jewish communities there. It is a source of support that will prove entirely reliable from that day to this. The transport problem is often even harder to solve, but it prompts a type of air-based adventure in which Israel has continued to excel. In a project known as Operation Magic Carpet, starting in June 1949, from the British colony of Aden. Between them they bring some 50,000 Yemeni Jews into Israel in an operation that is kept secret until it is completed.

Similarly vigorous is Ben-Gurion's commitment to the task of building the nation. This involves the settling of more than a million Jewish immigrants, achieved partly by the establishment of a great many new settlements, and partly by the strengthening of Israel's military forces. This is achieved by disarming of separate paramilitary groups and the merging of army, navy and airforce in the single unit known as the Israeli Defence Forces or IDI.

Mapai's long period in power also makes possible the gradual introduction of Israel's welfare state. In 1949 free compulsory schooling is introduced for all children between the ages of five and fourteen. The much broader National Insurance Act of 1953 and Social Service Welfare Law of 1958 together complete a firm foundation for a left-wing package of state-sponsored services including the provision of health insurance, workers' compensation, allowances for large families and old age pensions. This is a policy continued by the Labour party, introducing in the 1970s new areas of insurance (disability, unemployment) and more unusual benefits such as vacation pay for adopting parents.

In December 1953 Ben-Gurion astonishes and alarms the nation by the announcement that he is resigning from politics to join a small kibbutz in the Negev. Moshe Sharett takes his place as prime minister, but Ben-Gurion stands again in the 1955 election and returns to office as the leader of the country.

A seismic event in Israeli political history is the defeat of the Labour party in 1977 by a new party, Likud. This will powerfully shift Israeli policy in a right-wing neo-liberal direction. But meanwhile the Israeli Defence Forces have very effectively displayed their power in the long series of military crises and wars that also characterize the Mapai and Labour years.









Suez: 1956

During the spring of 1956 there has been persistent artillery bombardment of Israeli settlements by Egyptian forces based in the Sinai desert and in July Egypt blockades the port of Eilat, at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is Israel's only way of reaching the Red Sea, and the Gulf's very narrow southern exit can easily be sealed from the nearby Egyptian harbour at Sharm al-Sheikh on the southeast side of the Sinai peninsula. Israel therefore has a powerful motive for seizing from Egypt the eastern part of the Sinai.

To do so it needs a convincing pretext and in a roundabout way the events of July provide the opportunity. On July 26 the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalizes the Suez canal and sends in troops to secure it, against the interests of Britain and France.

Now Britain, France and Israel all have motives of their own to invade Egypt – Britain and France to reclaim the canal, Israel to occupy part of the Sinai – but none has a sufficient pretext for armed aggression. So a secret plan is agreed. If Israel begins the action, entering Egyptian Sinai and advancing far enough towards the Suez canal to suggest the intent to seize it, Britain and France will be able to intervene on the pretext of preventing the outbreak of another war between Egypt and Israel.

On October 29 Israel enters the Sinai. Paratroops are dropped at an important pass on the approach route to the canal while an infantry brigade moves south towards Sharm al-Sheikh, which is captured on November 5. Meanwhile, on October 30, Britain and France demand the immediate withdrawal of both Egyptian and Israeli forces to at least ten miles from the canal. Since the Israeli forces are thirty miles from it, the obvious purpose is simply to make Egypt do so.

With no response from Egypt, Britain and France launch their military campaign, landing paratroops at the northern end of the canal. Against active resistance from Egyptian troops they take Port Said and then begin to fight their way southwards along the canal. But this action comes to a sudden halt when it becomes painfully evident, from international condemnation and strong US opposition, that this is turning into a major diplomatic disaster. With an embarrassing loss of face, the troops from both countries are rapidly withdrawn.

Israel remains in the Sinai for longer but finally pulls back to its own borders in March 1957, with the guarantee of a demilitarized Sinai and a United Nations force in the region to ensure that both sides keep to the 1949 armistice agreements. Egypt's borders remain therefore exactly as before the war, but the next decade proves unusually peaceful in southern Israel. And the nation has again, as in 1948-9, demonstrated to the Arab world the military damage it can inflict. .









Conflicts over water: from 1953

One of the major problems inherent in the Middle East context is that three states, two of them hostile to Israel, share an area that is short of water. The Jordan, the only major river, is the border between Israel and the other two, Syria and Jordan. Each needs to extract as much fresh water from the river as it can, a sure recipe for conflict.

In the early 1950s Israel develops a plan that is not illegal but is certainly not neighbourly. It is to extract water from the very low-lying Sea of Galilee, fed by the Jordan but far enough from it not to be threatened by Syrian artillery, and to pump it up hundreds of feet to feed a gently graded complex of channels, tunnels and vast pipes that will carry it southwards through Israel. The project, constructed between 1953 and 1964 and known as the National Water Carrier, moves huge quantities of water and is immensely successful. But it is, ultimately, water from the Jordan that is being extracted.

Syria and Jordan are not pleased. In 1964, the year when the National Water Carrier is completed, Syria begins constructing a similar project. The idea is to build a canal that will divert the water from two major tributaries of the Jordan before they reach the river, carrying it in a canal southwards through Syria into Jordan. Unfortunately for the Syrians the starting point of the canal doesn't share the advantage of the Galilee scheme. It is visible from Israel and within the range of artillery. Every time any earth earth-moving equipment reaches the site it is destroyed by Israeli shells. The project has to be abandoned.

It is expected by many that this alarming confrontation must lead to war. But Nasser dissuades Syria from taking action. It is widely known that he has the intention of attacking Israel. But he is not yet ready.









The Six-Day War: 1967

During the early months of 1967 incidents across Israel's borders with Syria become much more frequent, initiated by either side and inevitably provoking reprisals. By early May Nasser, eager to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world, is making much more aggressive speeches on the theme of eliminating the state of Israel, And on May 16 he demands that the UN peace-keeping force in Sinai and the Gaza Strip is withdrawn. Its presence, protecting Israel from Egyptian attack, has been an essential part of the agreement at the endof the Suez crisis. Without the UN in place, Israel would be suddenly vulnerable.

Astonishingly U Thant, the secretary general of the UN, immediately agrees to this demand. Within three days all the UN troops have sailed away. Egyptian troops quickly move in to take their place. And on May 23 Nasser declares that the Gulf of Aqaba is now once again closed to Israeli ships.

With alarming signs that an attack may be imminent, Israel mobilizes some of its trained civilian reserves to augment the army. During the following two weeks there are urgent diplomatic efforts by the Israelis in both the USA and Europe to secure protection and avoid a war, alongside an intense debate as to whether a pre-emptive strike is becoming essential. Continuing signs of preparation for war on all three fronts – Egypt, Jordan and Syria, with troops even being drafted in from Iraq – tip the balance by early June in favour of striking first. The decision is taken to launch an attack during the morning of June 5.

At 7.45 nearly 200 Israeli jets take off for an attack on the airfields of Egypt and the military aircraft parked on them. Later in the morning Syria and Jordan launch an air attack against Israel, bringing them into the war. Israeli planes repel the attack and bomb the enemy airfields. Within the day more than 400 planes are destroyed and nearly all the runways are made unusable. From the first morning of the war Israel has command of the skies.

The campaign on the ground is equally quick. On June 7 Israeli troops enter the Sinai and recapture Sharm el_Sheik. Meanwhile the Jordanians are being driven from the entire West Bank and paratroops enter Jerusalem to fight for the Old City, known now as Arab East Jerusalem. By the evening of the 8th all these areas are under full Israeli control and Egypt, Jordan and Syria have all agreed to a ceasefire. But there are voices in Israel urging that the war must continue until the Syrians have been driven from the Golan Heights, the raised plateau overlooking Israel that provides an excellent vantage point for bombardment. This is achieved on the 6th day, June 10. The war ends.

Israel's newly occupied territory at the time of the ceasefire is massive, amounting to the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip (taken from Egypt), the West Bank up to the Jordan river and east Jerusalem (taken from Jordan) and the Golan Heights (taken from Syria), The taking of the West Bank means that more than a million Palestinian refugees, some from the 1948 war and some from this one, are now in territory occupied by Israel – potentially storing up terrible problems in the future.

There is initial hope by many that this situation can be used to secure international guarantees for Israel's security within the 1948 borders. The country is now in control of a vast territory, with a huge indigenous population, that can be used as bargaining power in a negotiation of land for peace. But the chance of this becomes increasingly unlikely owing to Israel's new policy of building Jewish settlements in many parts of the occupied territory.
 








Fatah and the PLO from 1964

A growing cause of Israeli unease has been a steady increase in terrorist incidents across the country's borders. These have been the work of two recently founded groups dedicated to the Palestinian cause and eager to harm Israel by any available means.

The first of the two, founded in 1964, is the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine, soon to be known by an acronym, Fatah, deriving from its name in Arabic. Its constitution states that one of its goals is 'the eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence'. .Its leader is Yasser Arafat who becomes – and remains for another forty years – the internationally accepted representative of the Palestinians. His influence is further emphasized when he becomes, in 1969, the leader of another large group dedicated to the cause – the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO.

The PLO, proposed at an Arab summit in Cairo in 1965, is designed to combine the diplomatic and financial strength of Israel's Arab neighbours with the shared intention of 'liquidating Israel' (a phrase in the founding manifesto).

Raids by Fatah across Israel's borders are for the most part small-scale and largely ineffective in 1964, but from 1965 onwards – and particularly with PLO involvement in the aftermath of the rapid defeat of Arab armies in the Six-Day War – the frequency and scale of cross-border terrorist incidents increases steadily. Most of these immediately prompt a more destructive reprisal by Israel. A pattern develops that has blighted life in the region ever since.

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The Yom Kippur or October War: 1973

Violent cross-border incidents remain an unpleasant but soon almost normal feature of the life of Israelis in the years after the Six-Day War in 1967. On either side of the new border between Israel and Egypt, along the Suez canal, are extreme incidents involving even artillery bombardments. These derive from Nasser's determination to regain the Sinai peninsula from Sinai, and in 1969 he escalates the conflict by declaring a War of Attrition. The following months are indeed a war, with full-scale aerial attacks across the canal by both sides. This confrontation continues until the death of Nasser in September. His successor, Anwar Sadat, rapidly agrees to a ceasefire and the next three years become relatively calm. 

But in the early autumn of 1973 there are alarming movements of Egyptian and Syrian troops towards the borders of the neighbouring occupied territories, Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israel decides against immediate call-up of its reserve forces for two reasons: a determination not to be seen as the aggressor if there is an invasion and war; and a degree of complacency resulting from the massive Israeli superiority in the 1967 war, leaving the conviction that an effective invasion by the Arab nations is unlikely. Nevertheless, in the first days of October, a degree of mobilization is authorized by the prime minister, Golda Meir. 

The sudden attack by Egyptian forces on the afternoon of Saturday October 6 is therefore not quite the total surprise it is sometimes described as being. Nevertheless it is met by Israeli forces inadequately prepared, and it has been carefully scheduled to take place on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, when most Israelis will be at home.

A massive Egyptian air strike and artillery bombardment on Sinai is immediately followed by 8000 assault troops crossing the Suez Canal and advancing into Sinai. At the same time, in the north, 1400 Syrian tanks advance into the Golan Heights. In both regions there is an immediate and significant advance on the first day of the war. But Israel achieves full mobilization and moves new troops to both fronts with extraordinary speed. 

By the end of October 10, four days after the invasion, the Syrian troops have been driven back to the border. In the south the powerful Egyptian forces by now on the east bank of the Canal prove impossible to dislodge, but the Israelis establish a relatively secure line a few miles to the east of the Canal. 

The war turns now into an extremely violent and destructive series of battles on both fronts, fought mainly with tanks but also in the air and with sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. Casualties are high and a vast number of tanks are destroyed, in both cases the loss being very much greater on the Arab side. But armaments are rapidly and immediately replaced by air lifts from the Soviet Union, and the USA soon provides the same support for Israel. As a result there is a fear that the two nuclear nations may become more actively involved, but both governments cooperate fully in a frenzy of diplomatic activity. On October 16 the Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, asks the Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin. to seek a resolution from the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire. 

Six days later this is achieved, and by the afternoon of October 24 it has come into effect. But in terms of the borders being fought over, the massive human and financial cost of the war has resulted in very little change. Israel still holds the Golan Height and the Sinai peninsula (though accepting here that Egypt will control the east bank of the Suez Canal, with Israel withdrawing to a line five miles to the east). And the West Bank remains unchanged, having not been involved in the war. One of the main Israeli fears during the conflict has been that King Hussein may align Jordan as a participant with Egypt and Syria, thus vastly increasing the scale of the conflict. But, with memories of 1967, he chooses caution and abstains. 
 








Labour and Likud: 1973-77

In 1973 a new political alliance is formed through a merger of several right-wing parties so as to provide a viable opposition to the ruling left-wing Labour coalition (known now as the Alignment). It takes the name Likud, meaning 'Consolidation' Its leader is Menachem Begin, a veteran of the terrorist campaign against British rule in the 1940s. In the 1973 general election, within months of being founded, Likud wins 39 seats in the Knesset. It immediately becomes the second largest party after Golda Meir's which has 51 seats. Begin becomes leader of the opposition, 

In October of that year a commission is set up to discover why Israel was so unprepared for the recent invasion and the Yom Kippur War. It delivers a terse 40-page report published on 1 April 1974. Its criticism of the incompetence of Israeli military intelligence is extremely severe, reinforcing the outraged sense of betrayal felt by the public. Although not personally criticized in the report, Golda Meir resigns as prime minister that same month. There is a bitter struggle between Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres to succeed her as leader of the Alignment. In the event Rabin wins narrowly, becoming prime minister. Peres, although from now on finding it difficult to work with Rabin, accepts the important role of minister of defence. 

The most dramatic event of the three remaining years of this Labour government, one that astonishes the world and greatly boosts the morale of Israelis, takes place in July 1976. An Air France airliner is hijacked by Arab terrorists and is flown to Libya. There the ninety-eight Israeli and Jewish passengers are identified and are flown on, as hostages, to be held at Entebbe airport in Uganda The demands of the hijackers include the release of terrorist prisoners held in Israel. 

Israeli public opinion is on balance in favour of submitting to this blackmail, but Rabin and Peres set in motion an extraordinarily bold cross-party plan (Begin is kept informed at all stages). After a week of highly secret planning four aircraft, with heavily armed troops on board, take off for Entebbe, 2500 miles from Israel. In a battle at the airport three of the hostages are killed in crossfire. The rest board the four planes, which arrive safely back in Israel. The only Israeli soldier killed is the commander of the operation, Yonatan Netanyahu. Twenty years later his brother Benjamin becomes the Israeli prime minister. 

The election due in the following year, 1977, brings the first major political upheaval in Israel's history. Likud becomes the largest party in the Knesset with 43 seats. The alignment, by now led by Shimon Peres, has 32. Begin becomes prime minister and thirty years of rule by Labour come to an end, 

In broad terms the difference is that Labour has been left-wing and secular and judges relationship with the Palestinians in practical terms of Israel's security. The party is therefore willing to make compromises where they coincide with that overriding purpose. Likud is more right-wing and dogmatically more religious, in the sense of seeing the Jewish homeland as the entire area described in the Bible as comprising Judah and Israel three thousand years ago. Indeed one of Begin's first acts on coming to power is to make it government policy always to refer to the West Bank as Judaea and Samaria. 

This territorial imperative means that compromise with the Palestinians is virtually impossible. It is Likud party doctrine that Palestine has been and is the region east of the Jordan and that the Palestinian refugees should move there. Alternatively Likud will accept them deciding to stay in the West Bank where they may be granted a measure of autonomy within the state of Israel and indeed certain limited rights as citizens. But the two-state solution, strongly advocated in Washington, is clearly out of the question. 

In private. however, Begin is slightly more flexible. He shares Labour's view that a relationship with Egypt, by far the most powerful Arab nation, is in Israel's interest. And he lets it be known, discreetly, that he would welcome a meeting with Sadat. 
 








Begin and Sadat: 1977-8

Sadat has said in private that he is eager to talk, and he goes public on the issue on 7 November 1977, amazing the world with a statement in a speech to the Egyptian parliament: 'I am willing to go to the ends of the earth for peace. Israel will be astonished to hear me say now, before you, that I am prepared to go to their own house, to the Knesset itself, to talk to them'. Begin announces that same evening that Sadat will be welcome, and an official invitation soon follows. 

There is a huge public welcome for Sadat when he arrives, and much waving of Egyptian flags on the streets of Jerusalem, but he pulls no punches in his speech to the Knesset. He says his purpose in coming is to prevent ongoing war between their two countries but emphasizes that a solution needs to include the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. His visit is followed in the following months by several other meetings between Egyptian and Israeli officials, but it soon becomes evident that a compromise is impossible and the negotiations grind to a halt. 

They are dramatically revived by President Carter in 1978. All the relevant parties are invited to a conference at Camp David, the presidential retreat in rural Maryland, with himself acting as mediator. The participants, gathering at Camp David on September 4, include Begin and Sadat with senior members of their cabinets. After intense negotiations, eased forward thanks to shuttle diplomacy between meeting rooms by President Carter, the seemingly impossible has been achieved. 

There is agreement on a 'Framework for Peace in the Middle East'. This includes several remarkable concessions by Begin. One is the first formal Israeli acceptance of 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people'. Others relate to the Sinai Peninsula, where he agrees to withdraw completely as far as the original border with Palestine and to give up all the settlements and airfields built since 1967 in Sinai (including even the one at Sharm el-Sheikh where Egypt had triggered the Suez crisis by using it to seal off Israel's access to the Red Sea.) 

The prize for agreement at Camp David is a peace treaty between the two countries, which have technically remained in a state of war ever since the hostilities of 1948. The treaty is included in the Camp David Accords, signed on September 17 by Begin, Carter and Sadat. Within weeks the Nobel Peace Prize hss been awarded to Begin and Sadat. 

But compromise of this kind enrages the extremists. Three years later, in 1981, Sadat is assassinated, by a group of Muslim fundamentalists firing automatic weapons, while taking the salute at a military parade.
 








Iraq and Lebanon: 1981-3

The remaining years ofBegin's period as prime minister are marked by two highly controversial military decisions. The first is the result of mounting concern that a nuclear reactor being developed by Iraq, officially and by international agreement limited to peaceful purposes, may have as its ulterior motive the development of nuclear weapons capable of reaching Israel. In the summer of 1981 Begin decides to send Israeli planes to destroy the reactor. This is achieved with pinpoint accuracy on June 7 and is greeted by widespread international condemnation, including a resolution passed unanimously by the UN Security Council. Israel itself is divided, with Peres and Rabin expressing opposition. 

In the following year Begin authorizes another military excursion against hostile neighbours, this time with ground troops across the border into Lebanon. The main reason for the invasion is the powerful presence in southern Lebanon of Israel's most active enemy, the Palestine Liberation Organization. It has been building fortified positions north of the Israeli border, from which it is able to shell settlements in northern Israel.

The official Israeli plan, as declared to the Knesset and the public, is to occupy the territory within Lebanon up to 25 miles from the border with Israel. But the commander of the enterprise, Ariel Sharon, has already given orders for Israeli troops to carry on towards Beirut where the PLO now has its headquarters. The purpose is to attack these as well as the command posts in the countryside, and thus to damage the PLO so severely that it is driven out of Lebanon.

The PLO. with its thousands of guerrilla fighters, has already been forcibly removed from one country in the region. In September 1970 it was expelled from its previous base in Jordan, after months of violent civil war between it and the Jordanian army. Sharon's intention is to achieve the same in Lebanon. As a result Beirut is reduced to a state of siege and from 14 June 1982 hundreds of PLO buildings in the western Muslim area of the city are subjected to heavy Israeli bombardment from land, sea and air. Finally Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO, accepts on August 11 that his forces will withdraw from the country. US marines and other foreign troops arrive to secure a peaceful departure from Beirut for Arafat and his men. This is completed by September 4. No longer welcome anywhere in the Middle East, the PLO finds its third home in north Africa, in Tunis. 

Meanwhile the Israeli presence in the Lebanon has also escalated to become a full-scale war with Syrian forces, referred to now as the Lebanese War, the fourth war in Israel's twenty-two year history. After a large loss of life in every participating group, but particularly in the PLO, agreement is finally reached in May 1983 that both Israeli and Syrian troops will leave the country. This leaves the Phalangists (the militia of the Phalange, the political party of right-wing Lebanese Christians and an ally of Israel) as the only powerful military force in the region. And they, on 17 September 1982, have been responsible for the most shocking event of the entire war. 
 








Sabra and Chatila: 1983

After the departure of the PLO from west Beirut, the part of the city with the largest concentration of Palestinian refugees, Israeli troops move into the area. It contains two large refugee camps, at Sabra and Chatila, which are believed to be providing a safe haven for Palestinian terrorists. 

The Israelis therefore seal off the camps, allowing access only to the Christian Phalangist militia in the expectation that they will identify the active militants. Instead the Phalangists, entering the camps on September 17, carry out a massacre. This has a strong element of revenge. Only three days earlier the Christian leader Bashir Jemayel, recently elected to be the next president of Lebanon, has been assassinated – an atrocity blamed at first on the Palestinian Muslims but in fact a plot planned in Syria. When the camps at Sabra and Chatila are opened, 2300 Palestinian bodies are found, among them some militants but mainly ordinary refugees, men, women and children alike. 

The Lebanese adventure has been profoundly controversial within Israel as well as abroad. On July 3, a month after the invasion and with Beirut under continuous bombardment, the Israeli pressure group Peace Now organizes a protest demonstration in Tel Aviv with an estimated 100,000 participants. But opposition turns to outrage, both internally and international, when the details of Sabra and Chatila become known. On September 25 another mass demonstration in Tel Aviv numbers 400,000 people, more than 10% of the country's entire population. The government is forced to set up an immediate inquiry into the massacre. 

When the commission presents its report, in February 1983, its conclusions are devastating. It is acknowledged that there had been no Israeli intention for this disaster to happen, but there is strong criticism of the failure to anticipate or prevent it and for not intervening while it is occurring. Sharon is singled out for special blame for not foreseeing the dangers of letting the Phalangists into the camp and for giving them no precise instructions as to what was expected of them. And Begin is judged to have been irresponsibly 'indifferent' to the situation, in spite of having earlier justified the Israeli occupation of west Beirut as being necessary 'to protect the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists'. 

Sharon resigns as minister of defence but Begin is also criticized for allowing him to stay in the cabinet as minister without portfolio. Begin himself retires from politics in August 1983 and is succeeded as prime minister by Yitzhak Shamir, his old colleague from the days of terrorist activities against British rule.

Read more:http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=3594&HistoryID=nni01&gtrack=pthc#ixzz3srIpcEvm

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

ARE THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS ILLEGAL? - Draiman




ARE THE JEWISH SETTLEMENTS ILLEGAL?




(MR. LAUER: When you talk about the lack of trust and you talk about the leaders, while you were there you talked about a time-out. You wanted people to stop doing things that added hostility to the peace process. 

Shortly after you held a phone conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu, he announced that he'd build 300 new homes in Efrat, a settlement near Jerusalem. He said he planned more settlements in the West Bank. This is right after you had a phone conversation with him. He mentioned nothing about that to you. What does that say about your influence, after your call for a time-out in the region? 

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think I have tried and I will continue to try. The United States is the only country that can actually help them get together. 

But as I said, Matt, the leaders themselves have to make the decisions. What I found when I was in the region, the people, the Israeli people and the Palestinians, want peace. I think it's very important for the leaders to give that a chance, to make some tough decisions. We are talking more with them about what the concept of a time-out means, because actions that create even greater lack of confidence, we've got to avoid those. 

MR. LAUER: But do you think you were blind-sided by the Prime Minister? 

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I wasn't happy. We had had a conversation, and I felt that going forward with those kinds of buildings was not helpful. It is not in any way not part of what they can do, but they shouldn't do it. 


MR. LAUER: It's legal. 

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's legal. But I think that, in this kind of an atmosphere, it's very important not to take actions that are viewed by the other side as creating more difficulties.
Interview with Madeleine Albright in 1997 )




THE "ILLEGALITY" OF SETTLEMENTS

"That the settlements are illegal, the conventional wisdom says, is obvious. But it is far from obvious.

The case for [their] illegality rests largely on a single sourcearticle 49(6) in the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. This article states that- an occupying military power "shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." 

Yet, as several international jurists have pointed out, not only has Israel "deported" or "transferred" no one to the settlements, whose inhabitants are there of their own free will, it is by no means clear that Israel was ever, legally, in the position of being an occupying power. "This is because, in 1967, Israel had as good a claim as anyone to the West Bank, which in effect belonged to no government. The Jordanian annexation of the area, while acquiesced in by the same Palestinian leadership that had rejected the 1947 U.N. partition resolution, was unrecognized by most of the world, and Jordan itself had refused to make peace with Israel or to consider their joint border more than a temporary cease-fire line."The conventional wisdom is also wrong in asserting--a frequently made claim--that continued settlement activity on the part of Israel is a violation of the 1993 Oslo accords. The plain fact of the matter is that nowhere in that agreement was there any reference to the settlements, apart from a single paragraph stating that. their fate was to be settled in final-status negotiations. This was hardly an oversight. The Palestinians wanted a settlement freeze and fought for one at Oslo; if they did not get it, this is only because in the end they accepted the Israeli refusal to agree to one. In repeatedly demanding one anyway over the ensuing years, it is they, not the Israelis, who have gone back on the document they signed." 
Author Hillel Halkin, writing in the June issue of “Commentary” on the legality of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria:

***



The Arabs have built 261 settlements in the West Bank since 1967. We don't hear much about those settlements. We hear instead about the number of Jewish settlements that have been created. We hear how destabilizing they are -- how provocative they are. Yet, by comparison, only 144 Jewish settlements have been built since 1967 -- including those surrounding Jerusalem, in the West Bank and in Gaza. The number of Arab settlers is based on statistics collected on the Allenby Bridge and other collection points between Israel and Jordan. It is based on the number of Arab day workers entering but not leaving Israel. The numbers were published by the Israel Central Bureau for Statistics during the administration of Binyamin Netanyahu and subsequently denied as "recording errors" by the Ehud Barak administration. Of course, the Barak administration had incentives for denying the high illegal immigration numbers, given its heavy political reliance on Arab voters. Is this a new phenomenon? Absolutely not. This has always been the case.

Arabs have been flocking to Israel ever since it was created and even before, coinciding with the wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine prior to 1948. 

Winston Churchill said in 1939: "So far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population." 
"What is a Palestinian?" by Joseph Farah April 25, 2001, WorldNetDaily.com. 

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars Avi Shlaim



The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars

Avi Shlaim
in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 219-40.

The Middle East has been one of the most volatile and violent subsystems of the international political systems since the end of the Second World War. Postwar history in the Middle East has been punctuated by an unusually high number of full-scale, inter-state wars. The aim of this chapter is to explore the underlying causes of the largest category of Middle Eastern wars, namely, the Arab-Israeli wars. Wars which are not directly related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, like the Yemen war of 1961-64 and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, lie outside the scope of this chapter. Within the scope of this chapter are all seven major Arab-Israeli wars: the 1948 Palestine war, the 1956 Suez war, the June 1967 Six-Day War, the 1969-70 War of Attrition, the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Lebanon war, and the 1991 Gulf war. It is the origins of these wars which will be examined here in an attempt to see whether any general patterns emerge.

The Level-of-Analysis Problem
    In dealing with the origins of wars, as with any other class of international events, it is important to be clear about the level of analysis. J. David Singer, in a famous article, identified the two most widely employed levels of analysis in International Relations: the international system and the national sub-systems. The first level of analysis focuses on the international system and its impact on the behaviour of states. The second focuses on domestic influences on states' behaviour vis-א-vis other states. The first level of analysis has the advantage of giving generalizable and parsimonious explanations of the external behaviour of states whereas the second level calls for richer detail, greater depth and more intensive portrayal of the domestic roots of international events.[1] 

    Another well-known treatment of the level of analysis problem in International Relations is the book by Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War. This book is more directly relevant to the present inquiry than J.David Singer's article because it deals specifically with the causes of war. Waltz discusses the contribution which classical political theory makes to our understanding of the nature and causes of war. He does so by identifying three principal themes or images of international relations: war as the consequence of the nature and behaviour of man, as the outcome of the internal organization of states, and as the product of international anarchy.[2] 


    In Waltz's analysis the state is the most important actor in international politics and the principal cause of war in the international system. All three images are concerned with influences that incline the state to go to war: the first image stresses the personality and beliefs of the leader as a cause of war; the second image stresses domestic political forces as the cause of war; while the third image stresses the regional and international power game as the cause of war. Waltz's conclusion is that the first two sets of influences are relatively unimportant whereas the third set of influences is critical. In other words, states do not resort to war because of the personality of the leader or because of their domestic political structure or ideology but because of pressures emanating from the international environment.


    Waltz's three images of international relations constitute a useful analytical framework for thinking about the causes of war. One of the strengths of the framework lies in its universal applicability. The framework can be employed to analyse the causes of a single war or a series of wars in any region at any period in history. The post-1945 Middle East is no exception. If applied to the outbreak of Arab-Israeli wars, this framework would suggest three lines of inquiry: the psychological factors rooted in human nature, the organizational and ideological factors rooted in the domestic environment, and the systemic factors rooted in the international environment. The framework would also suggest that systemic factors are much more important than the other two sets of factors in explaining the outbreak of Arab-Israeli wars.


    Yet, precisely because it is so broad and all-encompassing, Waltz's analytical framework is less than ideal for the purposes of this particular chapter. In the first place, there is no justification for assuming a priori that systemic factors connected with the regional and international power-game are more important than the other factors in motivating states to go to war. This is an empirical question which can only be answered after reviewing the relevant empirical evidence. Secondly, the relative weight of individual, domestic, and systemic influences is likely to vary from one Arab-israeli war to another. Thirdly, these three sets of influences cannot always be fitted into neat and separate categories because they intermingle and shade into one another.


    A different analytical framework is therefore proposed here, a framework tailored to the particular circumstances of the Middle East. This framework identifies three central factors that contribute to the outbreak of wars in the Middle East: the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations, and the involvement of the Great Powers in the affairs of the region. Like Waltz's framework, this alternative analytical framework involves a three-fold division. But whereas Waltz's three levels are the individual, the state and the international system, this framework focuses attention on three sets of interaction between states. States are the principal unit of analysis in this framework. The states in question are Israel, her Arab neighbours and the Great Powers: Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union. These states dominated the international politics of the Middle East in the aftermath of the Second World War. And it is the policies and actions of these states which are assumed to be the principal cause of war in the region. A word of explanation about the three factors that make up this framework of analysis may therefore be in order.


Israel, the Arab States and the Great Powers
    The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is one of the most profound and protracted conflicts of the twentieth century and the principal precipitant of wars in the Middle East. There are two major dimensions to this conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian dimension and the Israeli-Arab dimension. The origins of the conflict go back to the end of the nineteenth century when the Zionist movement conceived the idea of building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This project met with bitter opposition on the part of the Arab population of the country. The upshot was a clash between two national movements for possession of Palestine. There were two peoples and one land, hence the conflict.
    The neighbouring Arab states became involved in this conflict on the side of the Palestinian Arabs in the 1930s. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the main weight of the conflict shifted from the local or inter-communal level to the inter-state level. In 1967 the conflict was further complicated by Israel's capture of the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan heights from syria and the Sinai peninsula from Egypt. From this point on, these states had a direct territorial dispute with Israel quite apart from their commitment to the Palestinian cause.

    On the root cause of the conflict there are widely divergent views. Most Arabs maintain that the root cause of the conflict is the dispossession and dispersal of the Palestinian Arabs, an original sin which was compounded by Israel's subsequent territorial acquisitions. In their view, Israel is an inherently aggressive and expansionist state and the real source of violence in the region.[3]  Most Israelis, on the other hand, maintain that the root cause of the conflict is not territory but the Arab rejection of Israel's very right to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East. According to this view, the basic Arab objective is the liquidation of the State of Israel while Israel acts only in self-defence and in response to the Arab challenges.[4]  But whatever one's view of the origins and nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there can be no doubt that this conflict has been a major cause of wars in the Middle East.


    A second source of tension and instability which at least on one occasion, in June 1967, helped to tip the balance in favour of war, is to be found in the relations among the Arab states. In theory all Arab states subscribe to the ideal of Arab unity but in practice inter-Arab relations are characterized more by conflict than by co-operation. Israel is widely held to be one of the few solid pillars propping up Arab unity, the one issue on which all Arabs, whatever their other differences may be, can agree. Opposition to Israel follows naturally from the belief that the inhabitants of the various Arab states, including the Palestinians, form a single nation and that Israel has grossly violated the sacred rights of this nation.


    A distinction needs to be made, however, between the rhetorical and the operational levels of Arab foreign policy. Whereas at the rhetorical level the Arab states were largely united in their commitment to oppose Israel, at the operational level they remained deeply divided. The conservative states tended to advocate containment of the Jewish state, while the radical states tended to advocate confrontation. For this reason, the conventional wisdom on Israel's role in inter-Arab relations is not entirely convincing. As a number of scholars have pointed out, the conflict with Israel has imposed enormous strain on the inter-Arab system.[5]  Far from serving as a goad to unity,the question of how to deal with Israel has been a serious source of dissension and discord in inter-Arab politics.


    A third source of instability and war in the Middle East is the involvement of the Great Powers in the affairs of the region. Two features of the Middle East help to account for the interest and rivalry it has evoked among the Great Powers in the twentieth century: its geostrategic importance and its oil reserves. Great Power involvement is not a unique feature of the Middle East but one that affects, in varying degrees, all regions of the world. What distinguishes the Middle East is the intensity, pervasiveness and profound impact of this involvement. No other part of the Third World has been so thoroughly and ceaselessly caught up in Great Power rivalries. No other sub-system of the international political system has been as penetrated as the Middle East.[6]  


    The dominant Great Powers in the Middle East were the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution in 1918, Britain and France until, roughly, the Suez war of 1956, the United States and the Soviet Union from Suez until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the United states on its own since 1991. So much stress has been laid on the role of these external powers that the history of the modern Middle East, in the words of Malcolm Yapp, has often been written as though the local states were `driftwood in the sea of international affairs, their destinies shaped by the decisions of others.'[7]  Yet this is a false picture, popular as it is with Middle Easterners and outsiders alike. From Yapp's detailed historical survey it emerges quite clearly that the dominant feature in the relations between international and regional powers is the manipulation of the former by the latter.[8] A perceptive survey of the period 1955-1967 by Fawaz Gerges reaches the same conclusion: the superpowers were rarely able to impose their will on the smaller states of the Middle East.[9]  Although the local states depended on their respective superpower patrons for diplomatic support, economic aid and the supply of arms, they managed to retain considerable freedom of action. Yet no account of the origins of Arab-israeli wars would be complete if it ignored the role played by outside powers.
    When the role of the Great Powers is considered alongside the other two factors - the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab relations - we begin to get some idea as to why the international politics of the Middle East are so complex, endemically unstable, and prone to violence and war. Against this background what is surprising is not that seven full-scale Arab-Israeli wars have erupted in the postwar period,but that some of the other crises in this volatile region did not end up in war. Our next task is to assess the relative weight of these three factors in the origins of each successive Arab-Israeli war, bearing in mind that these factors often interact in complex and curious ways.


The 1948 Palestine War
    The 1948 Arab-Israeli war was the climax of the conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian national movements which had been three decades in the making. As the mandatory power in Palestine, Britain had repeatedly tried and failed to find a solution that would reconcile the two rival communities in the country. In February 1947, the British cabinet decided to refer the problem to the United Nations and the struggle for Palestine entered its most critical phase. The United Nations, on 29 November 1947, passed its famous resolution which proposed the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jews accepted the partition plan; all the Arab states and the Palestinians rejected it vehemently. The Palestinians launched a campaign of violence to frustrate partition and Palestine was engulfed by a civil war in which the Jews eventually gained the upper hand. At midnight on 14 May 1948, upon expiry of the British mandate, the Jews proclaimed the establishment of an independent state which they called Israel. The following day the regular armies of the Arab states intervened in the conflict, turning a civil war into the first full-scale Arab-Israeli war, a war which ended in defeat for the Arabs and disaster for the Palestinians.
    Arab solidarity in the struggle for Palestine was more apparent then real. The Arab states, loosely organized in the Arab League, loudly proclaimed their solidarity with the Palestine Arabs and promised to provide money and arms. But behind the rhetoric of solidarity, the reality was one of national selfishness and dynastic rivalries, notably between King Farouk of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. King Abdullah who had reached a secret agreement with the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians, was reluctant to play the part assigned to him in the Arab League's invasion plan. The Arab League's invasion plan was designed to prevent the creation of a Jewish state whereas his plan was to let the Jews have their state and annex to his kingdom much of territory assigned by the UN to the Arab state.[10]  Divisions of this kind go a long way to explain the failure of the Arab states to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies in the battle for Palestine.

    Of the Great Powers Britain was most directly involved in the lead up to the Palestine war. Britain's policy during the twilight of the Palestine mandate is a subject of some contention. Pro-Zionist writers have assigned to Britain a large share of the blame for the outbreak of the Palestine war, claiming that Britain armed and encouraged her Arab allies to wade into Palestine and destroy the Jewish state at birth. There is no evidence, however, to sustain this charge, and considerable evidence to suggest that Britain tried to persuade the Arabs not to resort to war.[11]  


    On the other hand, Britain refused to assume responsibility for implementing the UN partition plan on the grounds that the use of force would be required. So the real charge against Britain is not that she plotted war against the infant Jewish state but that her abdication of responsibility at the critical moment allowed Palestine to slide into chaos, violence and bloodshed.


    America played a less central but equally controversial role in the events surrounding the Palestine war. American policy was a series of swings of the pendulum between the pro-Zionist White House and the pro-Arab State Department. In the fall of 1947, against the advice of the State Department, President Harry Truman decided to support partition. In March 1948, the State Department concluded that partition was impracticable and submitted instead a proposal for a United Nations trusteeship over Palestine. Both Truman and the State Department later urged the Jews to delay their declaration of independence and undertake on-the-spot negotiations in Palestine. But when the Jews proclaimed their state, Truman, without consulting the State Department, accorded it immediate de facto recognition.


    If America was first to accord de facto recognition to the State of Israel, the Soviet Union was first to accord de jure recognition. The Soviet Union supported partition and the creation of a Jewish state chiefly in order to weaken the British position in the Middle East. In early 1948 the Soviet Union permitted the emigration of Eastern European Jews and sent a shipment of 10,000 rifles and 450 machine-guns. During the summer of 1948, in violation of the UN embargo, the Jews received more substantial shipments of arms from the Eastern bloc which helped to tip the military balance against their opponents.


    The critical factor in the outbreak of the Palestine war was thus the dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. The Palestinian attack on the Jews provoked the civil war while the Arab invasion in May 1948 provoked the official war. Inter-Arab rivalries contributed much less to the outbreak of this war than they did to the subsequent military defeat. None of the Great Powers wanted war in Palestine but Britain lost control of the situation while support from Washington and Moscow encouraged the Jews to proceed to statehood by force of arms.

The 1956 Suez War

    If in 1948 the Great Powers played only a limited role on the Middle East stage, in 1956 the reverse was true. The war which broke out in October 1956 pitted Britain, France and Israel against Egypt. One of the many paradoxes of this war was that Britain and Israel, despite the bitter legacy of the past, joined arms to attack an Arab state which had long been associated with Britain. Another paradox was that Britain and France, old sparring partners in the Middle East, found themselves on the same side in this war.


    The motives which produced this unlikely alliance are not difficult to fathom. Britain was the primary mover. After the Free Officers' revolution of July 1952, Britain came under growing pressure to withdraw its forces from the strategically important Suez Canal base. With Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser as President, Egypt became the standard-bearer of radical pan-Arab nationalism. Prime Minister Anthony Eden regarded Nasser as the chief enemy of the British presence in Egypt and as the chief threat to the entire British position in the Arab world. Comparing Nasser with Hitler, Eden was convinced that the right response to this challenge was confrontation, not appeasement. For Eden, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 was the last straw. He concluded that Nasser would have to be removed from power if Britain were to maintain her position as a Great Power in the Middle East. The French also regarded Nasser as an enemy, not least because of his arms supplies to the Algerian rebels, and they too firmly set their face against appeasement. To the Israelis Nasser was a bitter and dangerous foe and they were particularly troubled by his actions in closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and in sending fedayeen units across the border into Israel. But it was the Czech arms deal of September 1955 which began to tip the balance in the Israeli cabinet in favour of a preemptive strike against Egypt.


    Thus the three countries had their own reasons for wanting to go to war with Egypt. But although their war aims were not identical, they were all united by the determination to knock Nasser off his perch. The French took the lead in mediating between Israel and Britain and in organising the secret meeting on 22 October 1956 at which the infamous collusion took place. At this meeting a plan of action was agreed and embodied in what became known as the Protocol of Sטvres. The tripartite attack on Egypt a week later proceeded broadly in line with this plan. Collusion led directly to the collision at Suez.


    One of the distinguishing characteristics of Suez was that it was the result of a war plot. Indeed, while conspiracy theories are common, especially in the Middle East, Suez is one of the few genuine war plots of modern history. Britain, France and Israel deliberately, carefully and secretly planned their joint attack on Egypt. The Arab world was deeply divided in the mid-1950s between the radical states led by Egypt and the conservative monarchies led by Iraq but this division was not a direct cause of the Suez war. Similarly, the Soviet Union and the United States, though increasingly involved in the affairs of the Middle East, played no direct part in the events that led to war. Once the war broke out, the Soviet Union scored some cheap propaganda points by threatening rocket attacks against the attackers while the real pressure for halting the attack came from Washington. The crucial factor in the origins of the Suez war was the convergence of British, French and Israeli plans to inflict a military defeat on Egypt and to bring about the downfall of Nasser.



The Six-Day War
    Whereas the Suez war had been the result of deliberate planning, the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was the result of a crisis slide. President Nasser appeared to challenge Israel to a duel but most observers agree that he neither wanted nor expected a war to take place. What he did do was to embark on an exercise in brinkmanship which went over the brink. On 13 May 1967 Nasser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border, he expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, and, on 22 May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. On 5 June Israel seized the initiative and launched the short, sharp war which ended in a resounding military defeat for Egypt, Syria and Jordan.
    The decisive factor in triggering the crisis that led to the Six-Day War was inter-Arab rivalries. It may sound perverse to suggest that the war owed more to the rivalries between the Arab states than to the dispute between them and Israel, but such a view is supported by the facts. The Arab world was in a state of considerable turmoil arising out of the conflict and suspicions between the radical and the conservative regimes. A militant Ba'th regime rose to power in Syria in February 1966 and started agitating for a war to liberate Palestine. President Nasser came under growing pressure to stop hiding behind the skirts of the United Nations and to come to the rescue of the embattled regime in Damascus. Nasser suspected his Syrian allies of wanting to drag him into a war with Israel while they suspected that, if push came to shove, he would leave them to face Israel on their own. Nasser's first move, the deployment of the Egyptian army in Sinai, was not intended as a prelude to an attack on Israel but as a political manoeuvre designed to deter the Israelis and to shore up his prestige at home and in the Arab world. This move, however, started a chain reaction which Nasser was unable to control.

    In early May 1967 the old quarrel between Israel and the Arabs seemed almost irrelevant. As Malcolm Kerr observed in The Arab Cold War, the Arabs were more preoccupied with one another than they were with Israel. Even when the Israelis first appeared on the scene, they were merely there as a football for the Arabs, kicked onto the field first by the Syrian hot-heads and then again by Nasser. The Israelis, however, took a different view of themselves. It became a case of the football kicking the players.[12] 


    The superpowers did very little to prevent the slide towards war. The Soviets fed Nasser with a false report about Israeli troop concentrations and supported his deployment of Egyptian troops in Sinai in the interest of bolstering the left-wing regime in Damascus and in the hope of deterring Israel from moving against this regime. Their subsequent attempts to restrain Nasser had very little effect. They probably hoped to make some political gains by underlining their own commitment to the Arabs and the pro-Israeli orientation of American foreign policy. But they seriously miscalculated the danger of war and they were swept up in a fast-moving crisis which they themselves had helped to unleash.


    America features very prominently in Arab conspiracy theories purporting to explain the causes and outcome of the June war. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser's confidant, for example, claims that Lyndon Johnson was obsessed with Nasser and that he conspired with Israel to bring him down.[13]  Such explanations, however, are transparently self-serving in that they assign all the blame for the war to America and Israel and overlook the part played by Arab provocations and miscalculations.


    In fact, the American position during the upswing phase of the crisis was hesitant, weak and ambiguous. President Johnson initially tried to prevent a war by restraining Israel and issuing warnings to the Egyptians and the Soviets. Because these warnings had no visible effect on Nasser's conduct, some of Johnson's advisers toyed with the idea of unleashing Israel against Egypt. Johnson himself was decidedly against giving Israel the green light to attack. His signals to the Israelis amounted to what William Quandt termed `a yellow light' but, as for most motorists, the yellow light amounted to a green light.[14] 


The War of Attrition
    The March 1969-August 1970 Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition was a direct result of the problems created for the Arab world by the Six-Day War. Israel had not only won a resounding military victory but ended the war in possession of large tracts of Arab land - the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Sinai peninsula. UN Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called on Israel to withdraw from these occupied territories in return for peace with the Arabs but the Israelis and the Arabs interpreted Resolution 242 rather differently and Israel's position progressively hardened. Israel became attached to the new territorial status quo and was confident of her ability to maintain this status quo indefinitely. Her strategy was to sit tight on the new case-fire lines until the Arabs had no alternative but to accept her terms for a settlement.

    For a short period the Arabs closed ranks against the common enemy and the bitter consequences of defeat but the old divisions gradually reasserted themselves. The main division was between the advocates of a political settlement and those who believed that what was taken by force could only be recovered by force. At the summit conference held in Khartoum in late August 1967, these divisions were papered over by means of a resolution which was dubbed the three `noes' of Khartoum - no recognition, no negotiations and no peace with Israel. The conference demonstrated the uselessness of pan-Arabism as a framework for deciding a realistic policy towards Israel. The political option was rejected even at a time when an Arab military option palpably and painfully was not available. While Arab unity was preserved at the declaratory level, at the practical level each Arab state was left to decide for itself how to go about recovering the territory it had lost.

    President Nasser adopted a strategy which fell into three phases: the purely defensive phase of re-equipping and reorganizing the Egyptian armed forces, leading to the second phase of active deterrence, which would be followed finally by the liberation of the territory that had been lost. Nasser's central aim after the 1967 defeat was to lift the Middle East dispute from the local level, at which Israel had demonstrated its superiority, to the international level. He therefore set out to involve the Soviet Union as deeply as possible in the Middle East problem. If a satisfactory political settlement could be reached with Soviet help, that would be fine, but if a political solution could not be found, the Soviet Union would be under some obligation to help Egypt develop a military option against Israel.[15] 


    The Soviet Union stepped up considerably its material and military support to Syria and Egypt after the 1967 defeat and it also became deeply involved in the diplomacy of the Middle East dispute. Although it was opposed to the resumption of all-out war, it supported the Egyptian commando raids across the Suez Canal which developed, by March 1969, into what became known as the War of Attrition.

    Nasser decided to begin a war of attrition only after it became clear that diplomacy alone could not dislodge Israel from Sinai and after enlisting Soviet support for limited military action against Israel. The aim of the war was to bring about Israel's withdrawal from Sinai. The strategy adopted was that of a limited but prolonged war which would exact heavy casualties, exhaust Israel psychologically, and impose an intolerable burden on her economy. Israel's aim during the run-up to the War of Attrition and during the war itself was to preserve the territorial, political and military status quo created by the Six-Day War. In all other Arab-Israeli wars, the side that started the war did so in order to preserve the status quo. This was true of the Arabs in 1948 and of Israel in 1956 and 1967. In the War of Attrition, the side that started the war, Egypt, was not out to defend but to change the status quo.[16] 


The Yom Kippur War
    The War of Attrition ended in a military draw between Israel and Egypt and it was followed by a deadlock on the diplomatic front which was not broken until 6 October 1973 when Egypt and Syria launched their well-coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The Yom Kippur War can be traced to three factors: the failure of all international initiatives for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; the emergence of an Arab coalition which was able and willing to do battle with Israel; and the steady flow of arms from the superpowers to their regional clients.
    International initiatives for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict failed largely as a result of Israeli intransigence. After Anwar Sadat succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser as President in September 1970, there was a distinct shift in Egyptian policy away from military activity towards the quest for a political solution. Sadat's public declaration in February 1971 of his readiness for a peaceful agreement with Israel was a significant turning-point in the generation-old conflict. But the deadlock over the implementation of UN Resolution 242 could not be broken because Israel flatly refused to return to the lines of 4 June 1967. On 4 February 1971, Sadat put forward his own plan for an interim settlement, based on a limited Israeli pull-back from the Suez Canal and the reopening of the canal for international shipping, but this plan, too, was rejected by Israel. Continued Israeli stone-walling persuaded Sadat, by November 1972, that a resort to force was essential in order to break the pattern of standstill diplomacy. From that point he started planning the military offensive which was code-named `Operation Spark'.
    Under the leadership of Golda Meir, Israel kept raising her price for a political settlement just when Egypt became convinced of the need for a historic compromise. Immobilism was the hallmark of Mrs. Meir's foreign policy. Holding on to the territories acquired in 1967 gradually replaced the quest for a settlement as Israel's top priority. Mrs Meir continued to proclaim Israel's desire for peace but this was a pious hope rather than a plan of action. Her actual strategy was to let Sadat sweat it out, with his range of options constantly  narrowing, until he was left with no choice but to accept Israel's terms for a settlement. The consequences of this strategy were to miss the opportunities for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and drive Israel's opponents to launch another round of fighting.

    Israel's intransigence gave the Arab states a powerful incentive to set aside their differences and formulate a joint strategy for the recovery of their territory. The early 1970s were an era of rapprochement and growing co-operation in inter-Arab politics. Relations between Egypt and Syria developed into an effective strategic partnership and the relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia also improved after Nasser's death. On the Arab side, Sadat was the main mover and planner on the road to war. His strategy was to mobilize all the resources of the Arab world, including the use of the oil weapon, for the forthcoming confrontation with Israel. It was he who took the lead in forging the alliance with Syria, in setting strictly limited aims for the joint operation, and in provoking the international crisis in which the superpowers, he believed, were bound to intervene in order to secure a settlement.


    Soviet policy in the period 1970-1973 was inconsistent and contradictory. The Soviet Union's overall policy of detente with the United States led it to behave with great caution in the Middle East. It was Moscow's refusal to give Egypt the weapons she needed to have a viable military option against Israel that prompted Sadat, in July 1972, to expel the Soviet military advisers from his country. By the beginning of 1973, however,the Soviets resumed arms supplies to Egypt in the knowledge that an offensive against Israel was being planned. The Soviets continued to urge their Arab allies to avoid war while supplying them with sufficient arms to enable them to resume hostilities.[17]
    The United States contributed to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War indirectly and inadvertently by supporting the Israeli policy of trying to maintain an untenable status quo. Republican President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, approached the Middle East from a globalist perspective and sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the area. They perceived Israel as a strategic asset and a bastion of regional stability. They embraced the Israeli thesis that a strong Israel was the best deterrent to war in the Middle East. In accordance with this thesis, they provided Israel with economic and military aid on an ever growing scale while declining to put pressure on her to return to the pre-1967 lines. Even after Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers, the Americans persisted in this standstill diplomacy which eventually drove Egypt and Syria not to accept Israel's terms for a settlement but to resort to war.

The 1982 Lebanon War
    The 1982 Lebanon war was the result of the unresolved dispute, or only partially resolved dispute, between Israel and the Arabs. The origins of this war can be traced back to the rise to power in Israel of the right-wing Likud Party headed by Menahem Begin in 1977. It was Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 which started the war in Lebanon and provoked the clash with the PLO and Syrian forces on Lebanon's territory. Officially the war was called `Operation Peace for the Galilee' to suggest that its purpose was purely defensive, to secure the Galilee against attacks from the PLO forces stationed in southern Lebanon. But the broader aims of the war were to create a new political order in Lebanon, to establish Israeli hegemony in the Levant and to pave the way to the absorption of the West Bank in line with the Likud's nationalistic ideology of Greater Israel. In this sense, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was only the culmination of a long process of Israeli intervention in domestic and regional Arab politics.[18]
    Internal political divisions in Lebanon and inter-Arab rivalries did not directly cause the war but they facilitated and encouraged Israeli intervention. Lebanon itself had no territorial dispute with Israel and had only half-heartedly participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. But the weakness of the Lebanese state and the fragmentation of Lebanese politics not only permitted but invited intervention by outside powers, notably Syria and Israel. Palestinian presence in Lebanon greatly added to this internal turmoil which in 1976 erupted into a civil war. Syria intervened in the civil war on the side of the Christian forces against the Lebanese left and the PLO. By maintaining a large military presence in Lebanon, Syria became the de facto arbiter of Lebanese politics. And this accentuated further the geopolitical contest between Syria and Israel for mastery in the Levant.[19]   

    Another major rift in the Arab world opened up when President Sadat signed the Camp David accords with Israel in 1978 and a peace treaty in 1979. Throughout the Arab world Sadat was denounced as a traitor and Egypt was drummed out of the Arab League. President Hafez al-Assad was one of Sadat's fiercest critics, arguing that the only way to negotiate with Israel is by maintaining a united Arab front. Sadat argued in self-defence that Egypt's peace treaty with Israel was only a first step towards comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The Likud government, however, exploited Egypt's disengagement from the conflict in order to press its strategic advantage against the rest of Israel's Arab opponents and especially against the Palestinians.


    The chief architect of Israel's war in Lebanon was defence minister Ariel Sharon. A ruthless and cynical politician, he was also a great believer in using force to solve political problems. Sharon's `big plan' had a number of objectives. The first objective was to destroy the military infrastructure of the PLO in southern Lebanon and thereby to break the backbone of Palestinian resistance to the imposition of permanent Israeli rule over the West Bank. The second objective was to help Bashir Gemayel, leader of one of the Christian militias, in his bid for power so as to bring about a new political order in Lebanon and one which was expected to be amenable to a peace agreement with Israel. The third objective was to defeat the Syrian forces in Lebanon and to replace the Syrian protectorate of the country with an Israeli protectorate. In short, the idea was to use Israel's military power in order to accomplish a politico-strategic revolution round Israel's eastern and northern borders. It was not the much-vaunted Israeli aspiration to peaceful co-existence with the Arabs that inspired this war but Sharon's relentless drive to assert Israeli hegemony over the entire region.[20] 


    Israeli propaganda surrounding the invasion dwelt on the security threat posed by the PLO presence in southern Lebanon. But in July 1981 the United States had negotiated a cease-fire between the two arch-enemies, the PLO and Israel, and over the next year the border between Lebanon and Israel remained quiet. It was not the military power of the PLO but its growing political moderation that provoked anxiety in Jerusalem. The war party was simply waiting for a pretext to invade Lebanon and on 3 June 1982 a pretext arrived in the form of an assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador in London. The attempt was ordered not by the PLO but by the renegade terrorist, Abu Nidal. But on 6 June, six Israeli divisions crossed the border into Lebanon, signalling that a full-scale war was intended rather than a small retaliatory raid.


    The United States played only a limited role in the events leading up to the war in Lebanon while the Soviet role was negligible. Neither superpower was particularly interested in Lebanon but they became involved in response to promptings by their local allies. Israeli propaganda charged the Soviet Union with aiding and abetting the PLO. But Soviet policy, as usual, was confused and contradictory. It is true that the Soviets enabled the PLO to stockpile large quantities of weapons in Lebanon but at the same time they were urging the PLO to suspend military action and to moderate its position so as to open the way to a political solution. The arms were given reluctantly to placate the PLO and enable it to negotiate from a position of relative strength.


    The United states was dragged into the Lebanese quagmire by her importunate Israeli ally. Republican President Ronald Reagan looked at the Middle East through Cold War spectacles and held decidedly pro-Israeli views. To secure American backing Israeli officials stressed that their plan would weaken the pro-Soviet forces in the Middle East: Syria, the PLO, and the radical factions in Lebanon. At a meeting in Washington  in May 1982, Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Ariel Sharon that the United States would understand a military move only in response to an `internationally recognized provocation'. Sharon chose to interpret Haig's convoluted statement as a `green light' to invade Lebanon. While the Reagan administration did not positively desire war in Lebanon, it had not done enough to prevent it. On 1 September 1982 President Reagan belatedly announced his plan for a Palestinian homeland in association with Jordan. It was a good plan but, like so many other plans for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, it foundered on the rocks of Israeli intransigence.


The 1991 Gulf War
    Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 provoked a protracted and tense international crisis which culminated in war on 16 January 1991. All the Arab states of the Middle East and the Gulf, Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the great powers were involved, in one way or another, in the Gulf crisis and war. By far the most important factor in precipitating this war, however, was the crisis in inter-Arab relations. The Gulf war even surpassed the Six-Day War as the nadir of pan-Arabism in the post-World War II era.
    The Gulf war had its origins in an Arab-Arab conflict which Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, tried, with only partial success, to turn into an Arab-Israeli conflict and which ended up as a conflict between the Western powers and Iraq - the first major conflict of the post-Cold War era.

    Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the last chapter in the Iran-Iraq war. During this war, which was started by Iraq in 1980 and lasted eight years, the oil-rich Gulf states and the Western powers helped create a monster in the shape of Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, they expected this monster to behave reasonably after the war, at least as far as their interests were concerned. But on 2 August 1990, Saddam suddenly turned against his makers by gobbling up Kuwait.


    Saddam accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil by extracting more than its share from the Rumaila oil field, which straddles the border between the two countries,and of inflicting massive losses in oil revenue on Iraq by exceeding its OPEC production quota, thereby depressing the price. But Saddam's motives for annexing Kuwait went well beyond this technical dispute over oil quotas and oil prices. Saddam was a gambler playing for big stakes. He annexed Kuwait for both economic and geopolitical reasons. He was strapped for cash, so he went on a big bank raid. But he also wanted to improve Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf and to secure her dominance over the entire region. In 1990, as in 1980, he moved against a neighbouring country as part of the same drive for power, wealth, territorial expansion, and military aggrandizement. The second move, however, was a considerably more serious violation of international law than the first because it was an attempt to snuff out an independent state and a member of the United Nations.


    The Arabs were so deeply divided in their response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that not even the fiction of a unified Arab nation could be sustained. Sudan, South Yemen and the PLO sided with Iraq. Egypt and Jordan wanted to mediate, to work out an Arab solution to the dispute and to forestall outside intervention. Nearly all the other Arab states denounced the Iraqi invasion and some perceived it is a threat to their own security. The merger of Iraq and Kuwait would have been a formidable combination both in economic and in geopolitical terms. It was widely suspected that Saddam's next target would be the Saudi oil-fields just across the border from Kuwait. Syria was another potential target. Syria and Iraq were united by the same Ba'th ideology but divided by bitter enmity and there was a danger that Iraq would sooner or later seize the opportunity to settle old scores. Thus, some of the most conservative regimes in the Arab world found themselves on the same side as the more radical regimes in opposing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.


    Israel's position in the Gulf crisis and war was distinctly anomalous. On the one hand, Iraqi aggression against a fellow Arab country seemed to support the often-repeated Israeli claim that much of the violence and instability in the Middle East is unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, by posing as the champion of Palestinian national rights, Saddam managed to mobilize a significant degree of Arab popular opinion, secular as well as Islamic, on his side. On 10 August 1990, Saddam shrewdly proposed a possible Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territory. This proposal, though rejected outright by both Israel and America, created some sort of a linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli crisis. For the remainder of the Gulf crisis, Israel tried to maintain a very low profile. Even Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli population centres, following the outbreak of hostilities, could not elicit military retaliation on Israel's part. This uncharacteristic Israeli forbearance ultimately defeated Saddam's efforts to turn an Arab-Arab conflict into an Arab-Israeli one.


    The Soviet Union, in the final stages of disintegration, was unable to play an independent role in dealing with the crisis and America was left to do all the running. The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait presented America with a series of challenges - to its interests in oil, to its interests in Saudi Arabia and to its prestige in the Gulf. It also challenged the old territorial order that Britain and France had imposed on the region after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Each of these challenges was serious enough; the combination ensured that Iraq's aggression would not go unanswered.


    America refused to negotiate, and took the lead in sending troops to the Gulf, building up an impressively large coalition, passing all the necessary resolutions in the United Nations and issuing an ultimatum to Iraq. When Iraq failed to comply, America and her allies launched Operation Desert Storm. The two aims of the operation were to eject the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and to restore the Kuwaiti government and these aims were quickly and easily achieved. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the villain of the piece, was not an official war aim but his survival in power certainly took some of the sheen off the allied victory.

    

Conclusion
    This brief survey of the origins of Middle East wars reveals a bewildering array of political forces operating in the region. The three factors identified at the beginning of this chapter - the Arab-Israeli conflict, inter-Arab relations and Great Power involvement - are unquestionably all important in explaining the causes of war. Yet the relative weight of each factor varies considerably from war to war. Naturally enough, in the majority of Middle East wars, the most salient factor was the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inter-Arab relations were a salient factor in the outbreak of the Six-Day War of June 1967 and the 1991 Gulf War. Great Power involvement is not as salient a factor as the first two but it did contribute to the outbreak of the Suez war and the Gulf war.
    Keeping in mind the three levels of analysis suggested by Kenneth Waltz helps us to make sense of the complex forces that culminated in seven full-scale Arab-Israeli wars. Far from leaving us with the impression of bewildering complexity, this analytical device helps us to pinpoint the salient factors in the making of each of these wars. Our empirical survey, however, illustrates not only the strengths but the limitations of this analytical device. Waltz suggests that level three (systemic factors) is much more important than level two (domestic factors) or level one (personality factors) in explaining why states go to war. Our survey suggests that the three levels of analysis intermingle and shade into one another. While systemic factors are indeed critical in shaping foreign policy, domestic and personality factors also play a part. It is too simplistic therefore to confine an account of the origins of a war to one level of analysis, however significant and revealing it might be. The other two levels of analysis also need to be taken into consideration and, just as importantly, the inter-relationship between the three levels needs to be explored.

    Britain's decision to attack Egypt in 1956, for example, cannot be adequately explained in terms of Britain's Great Power interests in the region; Eden's personal and highly subjective image of Nasser as another Hitler was a crucial ingredient in this decision. Similarly, Nasser's actions during the crisis of May-June 1967 were shaped much more by a desire to bolster his personal prestige at home and in the Arab world than they were by a desire to challenge Israel to a duel. Finally, Israel's decision to invade Lebanon in 1982 owed much more to the Greater Israel ideology of the Likud and to Ariel Sharon's incorrigibly aggressive instincts than to any external threat.


    To sum up, when discussing the origins of each Arab-Israeli war, the aim should not be to single out one factor but to assess the relative weight of various factors. Because there are so many factors at play, and because these factors are so closely related to one another, it is difficult to determine the precise causes of each Arab-Israeli war. But difficulty should not be confused with impossibility.

Notes:
[1] J. David Singer, `The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: Theoretical Essays (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77-92.
[2] Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959).
[3] See, for example, David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London, 1977).
[4] See, for example, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York, 1977).
[5] Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970 (London, 1971); Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, 1977); Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (Cambridge, updated edn. 1992); and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987).
[6] L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, 1984), p. 4.
[7] M.E. Yapp, The Near East since the First World War (London, 1991), p. 3.
[8] Ibid., p. 438.
[9] Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder, 1994).
[10] Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988).
[11] Ilan Pappי, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-51 (London, 1988).
[12] Kerr, The Arab Cold War, p. 126.
[13] Mohamed Heikal, 1967: Al-Infijar [1967: The Explosion] (Cairo, 1990), pp. 371-72.
[14] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington D.C., 1993), p.48.
[15] Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London, 1975), pp. 46 and 165.
[16] Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New York, 1980), p. 3.
[17] Mohamed Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (London, 1978), pp. 253-54; and Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 82-85.
[18] Kirsten E. Schulze, `The Politics of Intervention: Israel and the Maronites, 1920-1984' (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1994).[19] Patrick Seale, Asad: the Struggle for the Middle East (London, 1988).
[20] For a fuller account see Avi Shlaim, `Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: The Case of Lebanon', in Giacomo Luciani and Ghassan Salamי, eds., The Politics of Arab Integration (London, 1988), pp. 232-55.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
  • Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967 (Cambridge, updated edn. 1992). A searching examination of the changes in Arab society in the aftermath of the June War.
  • Sidney D. Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (London, 1982). A detailed account of the 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars with an emphasis on United Nations Peacemaking. Includes numerous appendices of UN reports and resolutions.
  • L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton, 1984). Reflections on international politics in the Middle East by a historian of the region.
  • Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (London, 1978). A full and balanced account of the wars written by an American military historian.
  • Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars (London, 1975). An analysis of international politics in the Middle East mainly in the period 1967 - 1973.
  • Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder, 1994). A perceptive analysis of the relationship between superpowers and local powers and of the origins of the 1956 and 1967 wars.
  • Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev (Cambridge, 1990). A general account of Soviet policies in the Middle East which includes a chapter on every major war.
  • Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York, 1977). An analysis of the aims of the two sides in the conflict by one of the leading Israeli students of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • Mohammed Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (London, 1978). An illuminating inside account of Soviet-Arab relations, written by a prominent Egyptian journalist who was close to Nasser.
  • Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (London, 1982). An Israeli view of the Arab-Israeli wars written by a former Director of Military Intelligence and President of the State of Israel.
  • l.David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London, 1977). An account of the escalation of violence since the 1880s which focuses on the relations between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs.
  • Netanel Lorch, One Long War: Arab versus Jew since 1920 (Jerusalem, 1976). A brief account of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a chapter on every major war, written by an Israeli military historian.
  • Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 (London, 1981). A general account of British policies in the Middle East which also covers the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars (London, 1984, 2nd edn., 1992). Relies mainly on British official documents to trace the origins of the 1948 and 1956 wars. Very sketchy about subsequent wars.
  • William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 (Washington DC, 1993). A highly informative and readable account of American policy.
  • Nadav Safran, Israel - the Embattled Ally (Cambridge, 1978). An informative account of Israel and America in international politics.
  • Peter Shearman and Phil Williams (eds.), The Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East (London, 1984). A collection of essays on Soviet and American policies towards the Middle East.
  • Avi Shlaim, War and Peace in the Middle East: A Critique of American Policy (New York, 1994). A brief introduction to the international politics of the Middle East since the end of the First World War.
  • Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan (Chicago, 1985). A president-by-president account of America's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  • M.E. Yapp, The Near East since the First World War (London, 1991). A comprehensive political history with many insights on the involvement of the Middle East in international politics and a useful annotated bibliography.
 
C H R O N O L O G Y
29 Nov. 1947                        UN resolution for the partition of Palestine.
Dec. 1947-May 1948           Civil war in Palestine.
15 May 1948                        Proclamation of the State of Israel and outbreak of the Palestine war.
Feb.-July 1949                      Israel concludes armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.
May 1950                              Tripartite Declaration (Britain, France and the United States) on regulating the supply of arms to
                                               the Middle East.

July 1952                               Free Officers' revolution in Egypt.
Feb. 1955                              The Baghdad Pact concluded between Iraq and Turkey.
Sept. 1955                            The Czech arms deal.
Sept. 1955                            Military pact between Egypt and Syria.
July 1956                             Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal.
29 Oct. 1956                       Outbreak of the Suez war.
March 1957                        Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.
Feb. 1958                            Syria and Egypt merge to form the United Arab Republic (UAR).
July 1958                            Revolution in Iraq.
Jan. 1964                        The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded on the initiative of the Arab League to represent
                                           the Palestinians. 

Feb. 1966                            Left-wing coup in Syria followed by increased PLO activity against Israel.
5-10 June 1967                    The Six-Day War.
1 Sept. 1967                        Arab League summit at Khartoum: "The three noes".
22 Nov. 1967                        UN Security Council resolution 242.
March 1969-Aug. 1970        The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition.
Sept. 1970                            Jordanian civil war, "Black September".
28 Sept. 1970                       Nasser dies and Anwar el-Sadat succeeds.
Feb. 1971                            Israel rebuffs Sadat's peace overture.
July 1972                            Sadat expels Soviet military advisers.
6-25 Oct. 1973                    The Yom Kippur War.
22 Oct.1973                        UN Security Council resolution 338 calls for direct negotiations.
21 Dec. 1973                       Geneva peace conference.
18 Jan. 1974                        Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement.
31 May 1974                      Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement.
26-29 Oct. 1974               Arab League summit at Rabat recognizes PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian                                             people".
4 Sept. 1975                        Israeli-Egyptian interim agreement, Sinai II.
1975-76                                Outbreak of the Lebanese civil war.
June 1976                            Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.
May 1977                            Likud defeats Labour in Israeli elections.
1 Oct. 1977                        Joint statement by the US and the USSR for reconvening the Geneva peace conference.
Nov. 1977                            Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem.
2-5 Dec. 1977                    Arab Front of Steadfastness and Opposition meets in Tripoli.     
6-18 Sept. 1978                The Camp David Accords signed by Israel and Egypt.
2-5 Nov. 1978                    Arab League summit at Baghdad denounces the Camp David Accords.
Feb. 1979                            The Iranian Revolution.
March 1979                        Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel signed in White House.
Nov. 1979                            Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Sept. 1980                            Outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran.
6 Oct. 1981                           Sadat is assassinated and Husni Mubarak succeeds.
April 1982                            Israeli withdrawal from Sinai completed.
6 June 1982                           Israel invades Lebanon.
1 Sept. 1982                        The Reagan plan for Middle East peace.
July 1985                            Israel withdraws from Lebanon, but forms "security zone" in the south.
Dec. 1987                            The Intifada begins.
2 Aug. 1990                        Iraq invades Kuwait
16 Jan 1991                        Outbreak of the Gulf War
Oct 1991                            Madrid Peace Conference
June 1992                            Labour defeats Likud in Israeli elections.
13 Sept. 1993                    Israel and the PLO sign the Oslo accord.
26 Oct. 1994                    Israel and Jordan sign peace treat



The British Mandate
The British Mandate
Source: Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 7th edition - Sir Martin Gilbert; Publisher: Routledge (Taylor & Francis), 2002; ISBN: 0415281172 (paperback), 0415281164 (hardback); Map: NPR Online